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EFFECTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE:  
A HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR THE SEC AND THE DOJ 
Serena Hamann* 
Abstract: Today, most global corporations claim to have effective compliance programs 
that ensure and monitor their compliance with all state, federal, and even international 
requirements. A growing body of literature and regulatory activity indicates that truly effective 
compliance programs must incorporate all of the “Seven Elements of an Effective Compliance 
Program” contained in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Despite these Guidelines and 
growing industry and regulatory interest in effective compliance, noncompliance continues, 
and many companies run into trouble when noncompliance brings their actions to the attention 
of the SEC and the DOJ. In turn, the SEC and the DOJ struggle to encourage effective 
compliance programs within these noncompliant companies and in the wider corporate 
community. This Comment proposes that the SEC and the DOJ should take a more integrated 
and holistic approach to compliance by regularly and publicly incorporating all of the elements 
in the Guidelines into deferred and non-prosecution agreements and penalty settlements. The 
agencies should also consider greater use of independent monitorships to ensure effective 
compliance. 
INTRODUCTION 
From 2006 to 2010, the Swedish corporation, Telia Company AB, 
entered into contracts worth over $331 million for consulting services and 
network codes with the Gibraltar-based company Takilant Ltd.1 The 
consulting services were a sham—Takilant was a shell-company owned 
by Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of former Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov.2 Telia bribed Karimova to exert her significant influence over 
Uzbek officials.3 With Karimova smoothing the way, Telia acquired 
Coscom LLC in Uzbekistan as well as the necessary licenses, frequencies, 
channels, and number blocks to do business in the country.4 A Telia 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to thank 
Dean Scott Schumacher, Professor Jeffrey Wool and the Global Business Law Institute at the 
University of Washington School of Law for introducing the author to the field of compliance and for 
providing helpful suggestions during the writing of this Comment. 
1. See Mark Mendelsohn & Alex Oh, Telia’s $965 Million Global Bribery Settlement, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/ 
11/telias-965-million-global-bribery-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/L2P7-7UA9]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
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executive and “certain manage[rs] and employees . . . understood that 
they had to regularly pay [Karimova] in order to enter the Uzbek 
telecommunications market and continue to operate there.”5 This state of 
affairs continued until September 2012 when a Swedish documentary 
exposed Telia’s corrupt dealings, and government agencies in several 
countries began to investigate.6 
On September 21, 2017, in the third largest settlement of Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act7 (FCPA) claims to date, Telia agreed to pay 
$965 million as part of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and Dutch officials.8 Following the scandal, Telia 
instituted a “new and robust compliance function throughout the 
company.”9 In the DPA, the DOJ discounted Telia’s fine in exchange for 
remedial measures including, among other things, enhancing the 
company’s compliance program.10 In short, the DPA states, “the 
Company has enhanced and has committed to continuing to enhance its 
compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its 
compliance program satisfies the minimum elements.”11 The DPA 
instructed Telia to maintain a compliance program that 
“incorporates . . . policies and procedures designed to effectively detect 
and deter violations of the FCPA.”12 At a minimum, this program must 
address: high-level commitment, policies and procedures, periodic risk-
based review, proper oversight and independence, training and guidance, 
internal reporting and investigation, enforcement and discipline, third-
party relationships, mergers and acquisitions, and monitoring and 
testing.13 This explicit and detailed focus on effective corporate 
compliance was the result of a 2016 FCPA pilot program made permanent 
in 2017 and reflected the growing wealth of knowledge concerning the 
                                                     
5. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4, United States v. Telia Company AB, No. 17 CR 581 (Sept. 
21, 2017), 2017 WL 8185886 [hereinafter Telia DPA]. 
6. Id. at 21. 
7. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494. 
8. See Mendelsohn & Oh, supra note 1; Press Release, SEC, Telecommunications Company Paying 
$965 Million For FCPA Violations (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-
171 [https://perma.cc/6SNM-C773]. 
9. Telia DPA, supra note 5, at 4. 
10. Mendelsohn & Oh, supra note 1. 
11. Telia DPA, supra note 5, at 8; see also In re Telia Co. AB, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Release No. 81669, 2017 WL 4175053 (Sept. 21, 2017) (cease and desist order) (discussing Telia’s 
responsibilities going forward). 
12. Telia DPA, supra note 5, attachment C, at 1. 
13. Id. attachment C, at 1–7. 
11 - Hamann (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/18/2019  7:59 PM 
2019] EFFECTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 853 
 
need for, and elements of, effective compliance.14 The DOJ and SEC have 
only recently begun to recognize and direct corporate compliance in 
FCPA DPAs. Business concerns and regulatory requirements have pushed 
corporations to develop compliance programs that address a variety of 
issues beyond the FCPA, but not all of these programs are effective.15 The 
DOJ and the SEC could do more to encourage effective compliance 
programs. 
This Comment examines the current state of corporate compliance 
programs and regulatory reactions to such programs. This Comment 
focuses on the SEC and the DOJ because these agencies have immense 
regulatory power to examine and influence corporate activity and can 
serve as an example for other regulatory bodies.16 
Part I will discuss the development of corporate compliance. First, 
Section I.A will define corporate compliance as it is used today. Then, 
Section I.B will outline why companies decide to implement compliance 
programs with special emphasis on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ 
“Seven Elements of an Effective Compliance Program” (the Guidelines). 
Part II will explain in more detail each of the elements necessary for 
effective compliance and how they interact with each other. Part III will 
showcase how, despite strong motivation and knowledge about effective 
compliance programs, companies fail to comply and agencies fail to 
adequately encourage effective compliance programs. Part IV will 
propose that the Guidelines serve as a baseline for regulatory enforcement 
and that the SEC and DOJ regularly and publicly incorporate all the 
elements of the Guidelines into DPAs, declinations, penalty settlements, 
                                                     
14. See Leslie R. Caldwell, Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot Program, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. ARCHIVES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/criminal-division-
launches-new-fcpa-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/6JME-VDNF]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 9-
47.120, FCPA CORPORATE ENFORCEMENT POLICY (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter PILOT PROGRAM]; 
Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the 34th International Conference on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ 
deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign 
[https://perma.cc/XZX3-JC28] [hereinafter Rosenstein Remarks]; David A. Silva, DOJ Adopts New 
FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, 14 PROF. LIABILITY LITIG. 16, 16 (2018) (“[T]he revisions 
described by Rosenstein formalize existing practices that the Department of Justice (DOJ) rolled out 
in 2016 as part of its voluntary disclosure pilot program . . . .”). 
15. See infra Section I.B, Part II. 
16. See CAROLE L. BASRI, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 22–23 (2017) (discussing how the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act gives the SEC the power to require corporate codes of ethics and conduct); Miriam Hechler 
Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 952–53 (2009) (“Although numerous 
agencies participate in the regulation of compliance through various industries, this Article focuses 
primarily on the Department of Justice . . . . Through their unequaled power to indict corporate 
entities, federal prosecutors have grasped the ability to define and impose notions of what constitutes 
effective ‘corporate compliance.’”). 
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and administrative orders. Lastly, this Comment will argue that the SEC 
and DOJ should consider using independent monitorships more often to 
ensure that companies develop effective compliance programs. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
A.  Defining Corporate Compliance 
Corporate compliance “means different things to different people.”17 
Definitions of compliance evolved over time to incorporate new areas of 
government regulation.18 For many years, corporate compliance as an area 
of study included only financial mismanagement and anti-corruption 
law.19 “In the past, each compliance effort,” whether antitrust or 
employment discrimination, “was confined to its own silo.”20 Even today, 
to some, “[c]ompliance risk may be a function of issues that any company 
faces (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley, Dodd-Frank, antitrust, Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), data privacy, insider trading, auditing, and tax) or 
sector specific issues (e.g., financial services, health care).”21 Scholars and 
practitioners also debate whether “soft” law ideas (e.g., corporate social 
responsibility) should be included in definitions of compliance, or 
whether only “hard” law, where government punishment for violation is 
clearly evident, should be part of compliance.22 In practice, many 
companies do not distinguish between the two, and corporate compliance 
becomes “a system of self-governance established by a business 
organization seeking to conform its conduct to the demands of public 
policy” more generally.23 
Over time, compliance has been recognized as comprising two 
elements: “management commitment to do the right thing” and 
                                                     
17. D. Daniel Sokol, Teaching Compliance, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 399, 401 (2016). 
18. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 
158–60 (2d ed. 2017). 
19. BASRI, supra note 16, at 3. 
20. Joseph E. Murphy, Policies in Conflict: Undermining Corporate Self-Policing, 69 RUTGERS U. 
L. REV. 422, 427 (2017) [hereinafter Murphy, Policies in Conflict]. 
21. Sokol, supra note 17, at 401–02. 
22. See Christiana Ochoa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Compliance: Lessons from 
the International Law-International Relations Discourse, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 169, 177 (2011) 
(“Scholarship in a number of areas that are highly relevant to CSR global governance suggests that 
firms regularly comply with legal regimes, even when enforcement is lacking or sanctions-and/or the 
likelihood of sanctions-is low.”); Erika R. George, The Place of the Private Transnational Actor in 
International Law: Human Rights Norms, Development Aims, and Understanding Corporate Self-
Regulation as Soft Law, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 473, 475–76 (2007). 
23. BASRI, supra note 16, at 3. 
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“management steps in order to make this happen.”24 Stated differently, 
compliance refers to the “processes by which an organization seeks to 
ensure that employees and other constituents conform to applicable 
norms—norms that can include either the requirements of laws and 
regulations or the internal rules of the organization.”25 It is now well-
accepted “that companies should have [compliance] programs to prevent 
and detect various forms of misconduct.”26 
Despite the ubiquity of compliance programs, critics continue to 
question their utility. Some argue that punishment is the optimal deterrent 
for corporations and if government punishments for violations were 
calculated to create compliance, then there would be no need for 
compliance programs.27 Others point out that “[t]oo much monitoring 
reduces the ability of agents to perform their jobs” and corporations need 
freedom to pursue business objectives.28 Still others point out how, despite 
compliance programs, violations continue to occur thereby proving that 
compliance programs simply do not work.29 Lastly, some argue that it is 
impossible for regulatory bodies to assess complex compliance programs, 
and, thus, impossible to reward those companies with effective 
programs.30 
                                                     
24. Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra note 20, at 424. 
25. MILLER, supra note 18, at 3; see also Todd Haugh, Nudging Corporate Compliance, 54 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 683, 700 (2017). 
26. Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra note 20, at 423; see also DELOITTE, COMPLIANCE WEEK, 
IN FOCUS: 2016 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY 4 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/governance-risk-compliance/us-
advisory-compliance-week-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W7S-9PQ2]. Deloitte received 558 
qualified responses from senior-level executives selected from a wide range of industries. Id. at 2. 
27. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, LAW AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR: INTEGRATING THEORIES OF 
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS 58 (2015).  
28. Sokol, supra note 17, at 412. 
29. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491–93 (2003); Anna C. Mourlam, Moral Enforcement: The Futility of 
Corporate Compliance Programs, 61 RES GESTAE 10, 10 (2017) (“Strikingly, internal programs 
actually designed to foster ethical conduct tend to have minimal (if any) impact on actual moral 
behavior.”). 
30. See Wouter P. J. Wils, Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, 
1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 52, 52–53 (2013) (“It is thus not possible for authorities and courts to 
distinguish reliably and at reasonable cost between situations where antitrust compliance programmes 
are part of a culture and practice of real compliance and situations of symbolic or cosmetic 
compliance.”). 
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B. Why Corporations Implement Compliance Programs 
Despite the above criticisms, corporations have greater and greater 
incentive to develop effective compliance programs because business 
considerations push them to do so, regulatory bodies either require 
compliance programs or reward effective programs, and corporate leaders 
face individual liability for failing to ensure compliance. 
1. Business Considerations 
Many corporations believe that effective compliance programs can 
give them a competitive advantage by allowing them to attract investors 
and avoid scandals that lead to drops in stock prices.31 Many institutional 
investors “now seek sustainability reporting” on Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) compliance matters in deciding whether to 
invest.32 Strong compliance programming also comes into play when 
companies conduct due diligence related to mergers and acquisitions.33 
During merger negotiations, strong compliance programs can help to 
alleviate “quality uncertainty,” boosting the value of a company.34 Lastly, 
companies also seek to avoid expensive private suits that distract key 
employees, forcing them to focus on litigation rather than corporate 
goals.35 
2. Regulatory Pressure 
During the nineteenth century, the United States saw “extraordinary 
growth in the scope and complexity of regulation.”36 Expanding 
regulation has made it more difficult for companies to comply with every 
regulatory requirement, incentivizing them to develop programs to 
                                                     
31. See generally Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. 
ECON. 107 (2003); SALLY BERNSTEIN & ANDREA FALCIONE, PWC, MOVING BEYOND THE BASELINE: 
LEVERAGING THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION TO GAIN A COMPETITIVE EDGE (2015), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/state-of-compliance-survey/assets/pwc-2015-state-of-
compliance-survey-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2V7-A62E].  
32. Kristopher Keys, Corporate Governance and Compliance, 2017 ABA RECENT DEV. 
INFRASTRUCTURE & REG. INDUS. 101, 102 (2017); see also About Sustainability Reporting, GRI, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/sustainability-reporting/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2019). 
33. Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, Compliance, Detection, and Mergers and Acquisitions, 34 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 514 (2013). 
34. See id. at 514. 
35. Sokol, supra note 17, at 403–04.  
36. MILLER, supra note 18, at 161. 
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systematically address all obligations.37 Some regulatory bodies 
additionally began to require corporate compliance programs. For 
example, under the Bank Secrecy Act, financial institutions are required 
to “establish anti-money laundering programs including” basic 
compliance functions like conducting “employee training,” maintaining 
“internal policies, procedures, and controls,” and employing “a 
compliance officer.”38 
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act39 (SOX) presented a significant step 
forward in government intervention in compliance. SOX Section 406 
requires corporations to disclose codes of ethics for senior financial 
officers.40 The commentary to the Final Rule also strongly encourages 
companies to develop comprehensive codes of conduct for all 
employees.41 Other sections of SOX require corporate officers to certify 
their responsibility for internal controls and to create confidential 
reporting frameworks.42 Under investment law and regulations, each 
investment company is required to “[a]dopt and implement written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation of the 
Federal Securities Laws,” to review those policies and procures for 
effectiveness, and to designate a chief compliance officer.43 In the private 
sector, New York Stock Exchange Rule 303A and NASD Rule 4350 
require listed companies to adopt codes of business conduct which are to 
be posted publicly and to disclose if any officers are choosing to waive 
any part of the code.44 
In enforcement, agencies have also begun to recognize compliance 
programs. The DOJ enumerated specific factors that prosecutors should 
consider when investigating companies, when determining whether to 
bring charges, and in negotiating agreements.45 These, known as the “Filip 
Factors,” include “the adequacy and effectiveness of the corporation’s 
compliance program” and the corporation’s efforts to improve that 
                                                     
37. See id. 
38. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2018). 
39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2018). 
41. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 
5,110, 5,118 (Jan. 31, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 249 (2018)). 
42. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 78u-6. 
43. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a–1(a). 
44. BASRI, supra note 16, at 25. 
45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL §§ 9-28.300, 9-28.1000 (2018) [hereinafter JUSTICE 
MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/usam/title-9-criminal (last visited Apr. 26, 2019). 
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program or implement new effective compliance programs.46 
Additionally, the Fraud Section issued a memorandum on compliance 
programs detailing eleven categories of questions prosecutors should ask 
concerning the corporation’s compliance program.47 Prosecutors can, of 
course, decline to prosecute. 
3. Declinations, DPAs, and Monitorships 
In the FCPA context, prosecutors can decide not to prosecute and issue 
a declination letter.48 The DOJ announced a one-year pilot program in 
April 2016 to encourage transparency and accountability.49 For companies 
to receive a declination, they must, among other things, conduct thorough 
analyses of the causes of underlying conduct, self-disclose violations, 
cooperate fully with the DOJ, and implement effective compliance 
programs.50 In 2016, ten prosecutors and three Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) squads joined the FCPA Fraud Unit.51 Companies 
that chose not to comply with the 2016 pilot-program requirements faced 
“coordinated, international enforcement” and fines up to $2.6 billion.52 At 
least in the FCPA context, companies have a clear incentive to implement 
compliance to avoid prosecution. 
DPAs that incorporate mandatory compliance program improvements 
serve as a regulatory tool for encouraging companies to implement 
compliance programs.53 When the DOJ or the SEC decide to take action 
against a particular company, the company and the government can enter 
into a DPA—an agreement in which the company agrees to aid the 
                                                     
46. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 45, § 9-28.300(A); see SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION 
STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS (Oct. 
23 2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm [https://perma.cc/WJ4Q-
7NGR]. While serving as Deputy Attorney General, Mark Filip developed the first iteration of the 
factors. Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on 
Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 56 n.29 (2015). 
47. FRAUD SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS 1–7 (2017) [hereinafter DOJ EVALUATION], https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/UTS4-GTN9]. 
48. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 45. 
49. Caldwell, supra note 14; see also Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 14 (“[T]he FCPA Corporate 
Enforcement Policy states that when a company satisfies the standards of voluntary self-disclosure, 
full cooperation, and timely and appropriate remediation, there will be a presumption that the 
Department will resolve the company’s case through a declination.”). 
50. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 45, § 9-47.120. 
51. Caldwell, supra note 14. 
52. Keys, supra note 32, at 104. 
53. MILLER, supra note 18, at 322. 
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government investigation and to “implement remedial measures”—and, 
in exchange, the government defers filing charges for a limited period of 
time.54 If the company fully complies with the terms of the DPA, then the 
government will decline to prosecute.55 Similarly, if a company reports 
violations and assists promptly with the investigation, the parties may 
enter into a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) in which the government 
agrees not to charge the company.56 Both DPAs and NPAs are privately 
negotiated agreements that contain factual allegations and legal 
conclusions.57 DPAs are filed with the court but do not undergo 
“meaningful judicial scrutiny,” and NPAs are not subject to judicial 
review at all.58 
As in the Telia DPA, these agreements often contain a provision 
discussing the company’s compliance program.59 For example, the HSBC 
Agreement with the SEC and DOJ concerned anti-money laundering law 
violations and required HSBC to institute structural changes within its 
entire global operations, to increase accountability for chief officers, and 
to invite an external compliance monitor to assess compliance 
programming.60 The use of DPAs rather than more formal adjudication 
has been criticized for failing to deter noncompliant corporate conduct.61 
However, others point to the percentage of DPAs which include 
compliance program improvements (74.9% in the period between 1993 
                                                     
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. In this Comment, “DPA” constitutes shorthand for both DPAs and NPAs. 
57. Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 504–05 
(2015).  
58. Id. at 505; see also Baer, supra note 16, at 974–75; Brandon Fox & Natalie K. Orpett, Second 
Circuit Limits Districts’ Supervision of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, PROGRAM ON 
COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT N.Y.U. (July 28, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_ 
enforcement/2017/07/28/second-circuit-limits-district-courts-supervision-of-deferred-prosecution-
agreements/ [https://perma.cc/9ML8-RNAQ]. 
59. See Baer, supra note 16, at 957; Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1015 (2017). 
60. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit 
to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-
na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations [https://perma.cc/RK5K-ZKVV]. 
61. Koehler, supra note 57, at 499 (“The disturbing impact is that while NPAs and DPAs yield a 
higher quantity of FCPA enforcement, they also yield a lower quality of FCPA enforcement.”). 
Koehler ultimately argues that DPAs provide no “meaningful deterrence.” Id. at 513. 
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and 2013) and argue that DPAs “can play a significant role in improving 
corporate governance.”62 
To help ensure corporate compliance with a DPA, the DOJ may assign 
an independent corporate monitor.63 The monitor serves as a “compliance 
watchdog” sometimes with “enormous power to effect change within 
large organizations.”64 A monitor is an expert in the field typically 
selected by the DOJ in consultation with the company, and whose goals 
and duties of the monitor are laid out in the DPA.65 The scope of a 
monitor’s power can range from mere advisory power to almost complete 
autocratic power to direct corporate change.66 The monitor develops a 
“work plan” outlining who they will interview and what documents they 
will review.67 Corporations that have been assigned a monitorship are 
incentivized to direct resources toward compliance and to evaluate and 
improve their compliance programs.68 For example, as part of its five-year 
DPA, HSBC agreed to hire a government-approved, experienced, well-
resourced, and independent monitor to assess its anti-money laundering 
compliance programs and provide recommendations for improvement.69 
The monitor submitted annual reports indicating some concern that HSBC 
lacked “integration, coordination, and standardization.”70 The 
monitorship was to conclude in July 2018, but in December 2017, the DOJ 
filed a motion to dismiss the DPA saying that HSBC met its obligations 
in strengthening its compliance program in part because of the monitor’s 
favorable reports concerning HSBC’s improved compliance program.71 
                                                     
62. Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61, 69, 104–07, 113 (2014). 
63. Baer, supra note 16, at 977.  
64. Amy Walsh, Is the Opaque World of Corporate Monitorships Becoming More Transparent?, 
2015 BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1 (Dec. 2015).  
65. See Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 
34 J. CORP. L. 679, 697, 711 (2009). 
66. See id. at 707–09. 
67. See id. at 715. 
68. See id. at 720.  
69. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 15–16, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-
763 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012), 2012 WL 6120512.  
70. Rachel Louis Ensign & Max Colchester, U.S. Monitor Says HSBC Anti-Money Laundering 
Systems Need Upgrade, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://online.wsj.com/new 
s/articles/SB1000142405270230 4157204579475390409390188 (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).  
71. Jill Teanor, US Authorities Lift Threat to Prosecute HSBC, GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2017, 10:12 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/dec/11/hsbc-prosecution-threat-us-money-
laundering [https://perma.cc/HXV8-LC9G]; Letter from Ronald L. Capers, U.S. Att’y E.D.N.Y., to 
the Honorable Ann M. Donnelly, U.S. Dist. Judge (Apr. 1, 2016), 
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4. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
Arguably, the most significant development in compliance was the 
creation of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.72 The 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines—a section of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines—address corporate behavior.73 The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines set out a uniform sentencing policy for individuals 
and organizations convicted of felonies and serious misdemeanors in a 
federal court.74 Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 
companies with effective compliance programs can avoid or reduce 
penalties for violations if they have maintained effective compliance 
programs as defined under the Guidelines.75 
The legislative history of the Guidelines helps to illuminate their 
purpose and intended impact. The Sentencing Reform Act of 198476 
created a Sentencing Commission tasked with creating federal sentencing 
guidelines.77 Congress sought to eliminate unwarranted disparity and 
uncertainty in sentencing primarily for individuals, but the Act also 
indicated that organizations could be sentenced to probations or fines.78 
Congress did not limit the power of the commission’s authority in 
organizational sentencing and expected that the Commission would create 
guidelines on any matters it considered pertinent.79 The Commission 
released a preliminary discussion draft of the Guidelines in 1988.80 This 
                                                     
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/digital_assets/63dd8c22-4eda-40f1-b7a5-
83e8b1da2d93/HSBC-monitor-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVU3-NE6A]. 
72. BASRI, supra note 16, at 25–26; see Root, supra note 59, at 1013. 
73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) 
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, at 1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2000). 
75. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, §§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5(f); J. Paul McNulty, Jeff 
Knox & Patricia Herned, What an Effective Corporate Compliance Program Should Look Like, 9 J.L. 
ECON. & POLICY 375, 379 (2013). 
76. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2018). 
77. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2040. 
78. See S. REP. NO. 97-307, at 6 (1981); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f); KETANJI B. JACKSON 
& KATHLEEN GRILLI, THE HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS (1999), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-training-
seminar/2017/Org_History.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4AL-J36Y]. 
79. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 169 (1984). 
80. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., RICHARD GRUNER & CHRISTOPHER STONE, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
DISCUSSION DRAFT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS FOR ORGANIZATIONS, 
DISCUSSION MATERIALS ON ORGANIZATIONAL SANCTIONS (1988), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/historical-
development/071988_Organizational_Sanctions.pdf. [https://perma.cc/YR9J-ECY8]. 
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draft did not identify compliance programs as a mitigating factor to reduce 
monetary sanctions but did suggest that compliance could decrease the 
“offense multiple.”81 However, the draft cautioned that courts needed to 
determine whether “the preventive benefits of the sentence outweigh[ed] 
the obvious costs of judicial oversight of private business operations.”82 
Drafters noted that “[t]he central aim of these guidelines is to improve the 
corporation’s own monitoring controls and to increase the probability that 
internal warning systems will detect future criminal behavior.”83 One 
working group member pointed out that “[t]he key to an effective 
organizational sentencing system lies in selecting penalty rules that will 
provide organizations with the most desirable incentives for their 
compliance efforts.”84 
After hearing comments from an attorney working group as well as the 
public, the Commission stated, “‘the first goal of the guidelines should be 
to provide sufficient incentives so that self-policing becomes a reality,’ 
and suggested that ‘the Commission investigate the possibility of 
beginning with a presumptively high fine range and work downward to 
zero for a “good citizen” corporation.’”85 The Commission went through 
four drafts of the guidelines, convened another expert panel of judges, 
consulted extensively with industry advocates, held many public hearings, 
and, in April 1991, voted to promulgate the new Guidelines.86 The 
Guidelines authorized a three point reduction in the culpability score, 
resulting in a reduced fine range if “the offense occurred despite an 
effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.”87 The 
commentary identified what is now known as the “Seven Elements of an 
Effective Compliance Program”: “established compliance standards and 
procedures,” high level compliance personnel, due diligence in checking 
the backgrounds of corporate leadership, employee compliance training, 
                                                     
81. See id. § 8.3.  
82. Id. at 8.5. 
83. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., RICHARD GRUNER & CHRISTOPHER STONE, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, DRAFT PROPOSAL ON STANDARDS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL PROBATION, DISCUSSION 
MATERIALS ON ORGANIZATIONAL SANCTIONS, pt. II, at 7 (1988). 
84. Jeffrey A. Parker, Staff Working Paper on Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations (May 
1988), in U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DISCUSSION MATERIALS ON ORGANIZATIONAL SANCTIONS, pt. 
IV, at 9 (July 1988). 
85. JACKSON & GRILLI, supra note 78, at 19 (quoting U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Public Meeting 
Minutes (Feb. 15, 1990) (on file with Commission)); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY 
REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS app. A (1991). 
86. JACKSON & GRILLI, supra note 78, at 29. 
87. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1991) 
[hereinafter 1991 SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
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other “reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its standards”—like 
auditing and monitoring systems, disciplinary mechanisms, and 
reasonable steps following an offense to prevent further similar offenses.88 
The Commission also noted that compliance programs would be 
assessed in light of “the size of the organization,” “the likelihood that 
certain offenses may occur because of the nature of its business,” the 
organization’s prior history, and the existence of applicable industry 
standards.89 Lastly, the Commission stated that if an individual within 
high-level personnel participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant 
of the offense, then the organization was ineligible for the culpability 
score reduction.90 
In 2004, the Commission amended the Guidelines by elevating the 
criteria for effective compliance from the commentary into a separate 
guideline and added requirements that an organization “otherwise 
promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a 
commitment to compliance with the law,” and “periodically assess the 
risk of the occurrence of criminal conduct.”91 The amendment 
“elaborate[d] upon [these seven elements], introducing additional rigor 
generally and imposing significantly greater responsibilities on the 
organization’s governing authority and executive leadership.”92 
In 2010, the Commission once again amended the Guidelines requiring 
organizations to “remedy the harm resulting from the criminal conduct” 
and to “assess[] the compliance and ethics program and make[] 
modifications necessary to ensure the program is effective.”93 The 
Commission also created a limited exception to the general prohibition 
against applying the culpability score decrease to organizations when 
high-level personnel are involved in the offense.94 An organization can 
receive the reduction if compliance officers have direct reporting 
obligations to organizational leadership, the program detected the offense 
before discovery outside the organization, and “the organization promptly 
reported the offense to the appropriate governmental authorities.”95 
                                                     
88. Id. § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k); see infra Part II for a detailed explanation of the elements. 
89. See 1991 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k). 
90. See id. § 8C2.5(f). 
91. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C, amend. 673 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2004).  
92. Id. 
93. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. 6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2010) [hereinafter 2010 SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
94. See id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(B). 
95. See id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(C). 
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The Organizational Guidelines are the product of meticulous drafting, 
years of experience, and expert opinion. Their primary purpose is to 
encourage corporations to develop their own effective compliance 
programs. The Guidelines have been credited with “achiev[ing] 
significant success in reducing workplace misconduct by nurturing a vast 
compliance and ethics movement and enlisting business organizations in 
a self-policing effort to deter law-breaking at every level of their 
business.”96 The Guidelines have achieved prominence beyond DOJ 
enforcement and continue to serve as an example for other regulatory 
bodies97 and businesses.98 
5. Leadership Liability 
The final reason corporations implement compliance is because 
individual corporate leaders may now face personal liability for 
compliance failure. Beginning in 1996 in In re Caremark International 
Inc. Derivative Litigation,99 courts began to assign compliance obligations 
to directors under the fiduciary duty of loyalty.100 The board of directors 
must make good-faith efforts to ensure that a corporation has adequate 
reporting and information systems, and the board will be liable for 
“sustained or systemic failure . . . to exercise oversight.”101 In Stone ex rel. 
AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter,102 the Delaware Supreme Court 
confirmed two elements of Caremark duty including an initial duty to 
establish a compliance and ethics program and an ongoing duty to address 
compliance and ethics.103 
                                                     
96. See ETHICS RES. CTR., THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS AT 
TWENTY YEARS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION AND RECOGNITION OF 
EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS, at i (May 2012), 
https://www.theagc.org/docs/f12.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW7L-77US]. 
97. Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade 
Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 713 (2002) [hereinafter Murphy, Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines]; Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 
39 J. CORP. L. 769, 797–98 (2014). 
98. Root, supra note 59, at 1014 (“Thus, the Organizational Guidelines as currently written are 
generally considered a strong source of guidance for corporations interested in developing, on their 
own initiative, an effective compliance program.”). 
99. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
100. See id. at 967.  
101. Id. at 971.  
102. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
103. Id. at 370.  
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Directors need not design and implement compliance programs but 
rather must exercise oversight to make sure management does so.104 
Plaintiffs bringing fiduciary duty lawsuits against directors must plead 
specific facts showing that directors knowingly disregarded their ongoing 
duty to oversee the corporation’s compliance program.105 These 
obligations are stated succinctly in the Guidelines, “[t]he organization’s 
governing authority shall be knowledgeable about the content and 
operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall exercise 
reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness 
of the compliance program.”106 
Under the Securities Exchange Act107 and SOX, CEOs and CFOs must 
certify that they have reviewed the company’s internal controls on a 
regular basis, and, in the case of misconduct, run the risk of having to 
return incentive-based compensation.108 SOX Section 404(a) requires 
reporting companies to indicate “the responsibility of management for 
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure.”109 An 
organization’s Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) is responsible for 
overseeing the development and implementation of an organization’s 
compliance program.110 CCO’s “should be competent and 
knowledgeable.”111 CCOs have even broader oversight responsibilities 
than other corporate executives.112 
These obligations force corporate leadership to oversee compliance. 
Compliance failures may lead to shaming of individual senior executives 
or directors.113 Individual prosecutions of compliance officers and 
company executives are on the rise.114 In September 2015, former Deputy 
                                                     
104. See id. at 372. 
105. See id. at 373. 
106. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A). 
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018). 
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 7243; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2018). Incentive-based compensation is variable 
contingent compensation, like cash bonuses, based on the attainment of certain firm or employee 
performance metrics. See Definition of Incentive-Based Compensation, LAW INSIDER (2013), 
https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/incentive-based-compensation [https://perma.cc/Y2BK-JLX3]. 
109. 15 U.S.C. § 7262. 
110. BASRI, supra note 16, at 182. 
111. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 
74,714, 74,720 (Dec. 24, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275 and 279 (2018)). 
112. See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Compliance Officers: More Jobs, More Responsibility, 
More Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 169 (2015). 
113. Sokol, supra note 17, at 405. 
114. See id.; Martin S. Bloor, Increased Prosecutions Will Likely Lead to Welcomed FCPA Clarity, 
N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/04/02/increased-
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Attorney General Sally Yates released a memo entitled, “Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing” emphasizing that 
corporations must report relevant facts about all “individuals involved in 
corporate misconduct” in order to be eligible for cooperation credit.115 
During confirmation hearings, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
“indicated an intent to preserve the broad emphasis on charging 
individuals tied to corporate wrongdoing.”116 CCOs in particular run the 
risk of individual liability for willful misconduct and participation in 
illegal activity when they “engage in efforts to obstruct or mislead 
[regulators]” and “where the CCO has exhibited a wholesale failure to 
carry out his or her responsibilities.”117 Some current examples include a 
$1 million civil penalty suit against the CCO of MoneyGram for failing 
to implement an effective anti-money laundering program and the arrest 
of a Volkswagen AG compliance executive after a diesel emissions 
scandal.118 
Executives can face fines, incarceration, and later career consequences. 
Individuals can be barred from serving as directors or officers of a public 
company or from the securities industry as a whole.119 In consequence, 
corporate leadership may be slow to report violations. A CCO may face a 
Catch-22 when their reporting obligations require them to report other 
executive officers to regulatory bodies because corporate leadership might 
retaliate. For example, in Sullivan v. Harnisch120 a company terminated a 
compliance officer after he reported his company’s CEO and President to 
the SEC for violating securities laws even though he had a legal obligation 
                                                     
prosecutions-will-likely-lead-to-welcomed-fcpa-clarity/ [https://perma.cc/PX65-2BFU] (“The Fraud 
Section charged more individuals in 2018 than in previous years.”). 
115. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Asst. Att’ys Gen. and U.S. Att’ys, 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing 3 (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/53WG-KKW2]. 
116. Keys, supra note 32, at 107; see also Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 14 (“Effective 
deterrence of corporate corruption requires prosecution of culpable individuals. We should not just 
announce large corporate fines and celebrate penalizing shareholders.”). 
117. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, Keynote Address at the National Conference, 2015 
National Society of Compliance Professionals (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/keynote-
address-2015-national-society-compliance-prof-cereseney.html [https://perma.cc/AM4Z-ZRN3]. 
118. See Keys, supra note 32, at 108; Adam Goldman, Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack Ewing, F.B.I Arrests 
Volkswagen Executive on Conspiracy Charge in Emissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/business/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-investigation-
settlement.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2019).  
119. Renee M. Jones, Unfit for Duty: The Officer and Director Bar as a Remedy for Fraud, 82 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 439, 441 (2013).  
120. 969 N.E.2d 758, 759 (N.Y. 2012). 
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to report them.121 Corporate leaders may now face difficult decisions and 
personal liability for compliance failures. As a result, leaders will be 
motivated to ensure their company maintains an effective compliance 
program. 
II. EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
Corporate executives must know how to evaluate whether their 
company’s compliance program is effective. The Guidelines provide the 
foundation, and a growing body of research unpacks and adds to each of 
the elements: standards and procedures, leadership oversight, vetting 
employees to exclude bad actors, training, monitoring compliance, 
incentives and discipline, and remediation and updating of the program 
after violations occur.122 Additionally, risk assessment and corporate 
culture increasingly play a role in evaluating effective compliance 
programs.123 
A. Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a “threshold step” for any company wishing to 
implement effective compliance.124 Regular risk assessment produces an 
in-depth understanding of the risks embedded in the company’s business 
model, including its products and services, third-party agents, customers, 
government interactions, industry, or geographic areas or operation.125 
The DOJ and the SEC have affirmed that risk assessment is key to 
compliance because effective compliance programs must be “tailored to 
the company’s specific business and to the risks associated with that 
business.”126 In February 2017, the Trump Administration released its 
“Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs” identifying eleven areas 
of emphasis.127 This guidance instructed the DOJ to look at the 
methodology “the company used to identify, analyze, and address” 
                                                     
121. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(a), (c) (2018).  
122. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 8B2.1. 
123. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2); id. § 8B2.1(c) (“The organization shall periodically assess the risk of 
criminal conduct.”). 
124. Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra note 20, at 448. 
125. See CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV., SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE 
TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 58–59 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]; 
BASRI, supra note 16, at 30.  
126. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 56; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, 
§ 8B2.1(c) (“the organization shall periodically assess the risk of criminal conduct”). 
127. See DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 1. 
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particular risks, to consider the metrics the company used to gather 
information, and to ensure that employees “in relevant control functions” 
receive risk-based training.128 Even before 2017, the DOJ recognized the 
importance of risk assessment. For example, the settlement agreement in 
Re Lender Processing Services, Inc. Foreclosure Fraud129 recognized 
how the company “acceptably enhance[ed] its risk management 
program.”130 
B. Standards and Procedures 
The first element listed in the Guidelines states, “[t]he organization 
shall establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal 
conduct.”131 These policies and procedures should be drafted by people 
from multiple departments and should align across the company.132 At a 
high level, they may include mission statements, letters from the CEO or 
president, and codes of conduct.133 A corporation’s global code of conduct 
sets out “baseline rules that apply across . . . worldwide operations.”134 
For example, Amazon.com’s Code of Conduct starts out with the words, 
“[i]n performing their job duties, Amazon.com employees should always 
act lawfully, ethically, and in the best interests of Amazon.com. This Code 
of Business Conduct and Ethics (the ‘Code of Conduct’) sets out basic 
guiding principles.”135 Sector-based codes of conduct help industries 
harmonize but can also help companies to determine what their code of 
conduct should contain.136 However, strong codes of conduct “meet[] the 
issuing organization’s own business needs by tailoring a provision on each 
                                                     
128. Id. at 4–5. 
129. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Florida-Based Lender Processing Services Inc. to Pay 
$35 Million in Agreement to Resolve Criminal Fraud Violations Following Guilty Plea from 
Subsidiary CEO (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-based-lender-processing-
services-inc-pay-35-million-agreement-resolve-criminal-fraud [https://perma.cc/YZ43-GEJZ]. 
130. Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Paul J. McNulty, Esq. & Joan Meyer, Esq., Baker & McKenzie LLP, Non-Prosecution Agreement, 
Re: Lender Processing Services, Inc. 2 (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/836356/download [https://perma.cc/28VD-7TVU]. 
131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 8B2.1(b)(1). 
132. DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 3; BASRI, supra note 16, at 31. 
133. BASRI, supra note 16, at 31. 
134. Id. at 115. 
135. Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, AMAZON (2018), http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-govconduct [https://perma.cc/Y7EP-XPQX]. 
136. See generally Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules 
Through Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029 (2013). 
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topic the code issuer needs to align across borders.”137 Each corporation 
needs to carefully develop their own code.138 
Additionally, more detailed written policies and procedures addressing 
different risk areas are necessary to ensure compliance.139 Corporate 
culture generally is a set of internalized beliefs, values, and ideologies 
shared by those who work for a given corporation.140 Organizational 
commitment to compliance and ethics is linked to employee perception of 
the integrity of the company’s executives.141 Even if a company has a 
wonderful compliance program on paper, unethical and noncompliant 
executives can alter a company’s culture entirely.142 
For example, in SEC v. Kenneth Lay, et. al,143 the SEC vividly 
described how three senior Enron executives continually broke the law, 
misled employees, and created acceptance of illegal activities at Enron.144 
In another recent example, after being assigned online compliance 
training modules, three Credit Suisse leaders asked their administrative 
assistants to complete the modules for them, presumably to save 
themselves the time and trouble.145 Element three of the Guidelines 
requires companies to use “reasonable efforts” to ensure that leaders like 
these who have engaged in “illegal activities or other conduct inconsistent 
with an effective compliance and ethics program” are excluded from its 
“substantial authority personnel.”146 Companies often chose to do this 
                                                     
137. BASRI, supra note 16, at 120. 
138. See Stucke, supra note 97, at 820–21 (discussing “copycat compliance” under SOX); Henry 
Cutter, The Morning Risk Report: SEC in Texas Flags ‘Canned’ Compliance Programs, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan 30, 2018, 7:33 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/01/30/the-morning-risk-
report-sec-in-texas-flags-canned-compliance-programs (last visited Apr. 9, 2019) (“[S]ome 
companies still see compliance systems as an off-the-shelf product that will work for one firm as well 
as for another.”). 
139. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 58. 
140. See DELOITTE, CORPORATE CULTURE: THE SECOND INGREDIENT IN A WORLD-CLASS ETHICS 
AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAM (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/ 
Documents/risk/us-aers-corporate-culture-112514.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AB2-3PSZ]. 
141. Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance through 
Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 971 (2012).  
142. See generally Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations 
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003) (describing the negative impact of Enron’s leadership team).  
143. SEC v. Causey, No. H-04-0284, 2015 WL 7301080 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2015). 
144. See generally Second Amended Complaint, Jury Demanded, SEC v. Kenneth Lay, No. H-04-
0284 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2007), 2004 WL 1600016. 
145. Bradley Keoun, Credit Suisse Bankers Got Secretaries to Do Their Compliance Training, THE 
STREET (Feb. 14, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14488740/1/credit-suisse-
bankers-pawned-off-compliance-training-on-secretaries.htm [https://perma.cc/YQ6Y-JNLC]. 
146. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 8B2.1(b)(3). 
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through background checks to ensure that those who might obstruct 
compliance do not join a company; this can also communicate company 
values to prospective employees.147 
C. Training 
Corporate leadership can enhance compliant corporate culture by 
overseeing employee compliance training. Element four of the Guidelines 
instructs companies to “take reasonable steps to communicate periodically 
and in a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects 
of the compliance and ethics program.”148 Training is required “to make 
sure that everybody gets the information and knows what is expected of 
them” in order to “raise[] awareness that the company actually has 
resources available” and to “raise[] awareness of the regulations and laws 
that are important for the company.”149 “Training does not itself 
necessarily change conduct, but it is an essential component to remind 
people that there are standards, there are laws, and there are 
regulations.”150 Companies must develop training plans and consider best 
practices and problems with different training methods.151 The 
appropriateness, language, content, use of stories, and repetition in 
compliance training should be carefully considered.152 The types of 
training given to different individuals should reflect the “nature of their 
jobs” and relevant areas of risk.153 Employees should not be spectators 
who passively watch the training but rather active participants.154 Trainers 
should also emphasize the availability of guidance and continuing 
advice.155 Training should not constitute a one-time event, but should be 
ongoing because,  
[m]essages have a better chance at cultural impact if they hang 
together as a coherent story; if they draw on already-established 
ideas, themes, or symbols; if they are consistent and frequently 
repeated through multiple channels; if they come from admired 
or authoritative sources; if they are relevant to our status in a 
                                                     
147. BASRI, supra note 16, at 207. 
148. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A). 
149. McNulty, Knox & Harned, supra note 75, at 381, 387. 
150. Id. at 387. 
151. BASRI, supra note 16, at 34. 
152. Killingsworth, supra note 141, at 964–66. 
153. MILLER, supra note 18, at 210; RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 58. 
154. Killingsworth, supra note 141, at 979. 
155. MILLER, supra note 18, at 210; RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 58. 
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group we consider important; if they resonate with experience (or 
constitute experience!); if they are broadly useful; and if they 
carry a strong emotional charge.156 
D. Monitoring Compliance, Internal Investigations and Audits 
Although a company may have effective compliance training, it also 
needs to make sure its compliance program contains “appropriate 
incentives to perform,” “appropriate disciplinary measures,” and 
monitoring.157 Compliance should be a normal part of employee 
performance evaluation and should be linked to compensation and 
advancement.158 Corporations should have clearly defined mechanisms 
for monitoring as well as response plans when violations occur.159 
Corporations can monitor employee activity through surveillance of 
employee work email, telephone calls, and on-site activity.160 Companies 
can also test the efficacy of their compliance programs or discover 
violations through “sting operations” in which an employee fakes a 
violation or a fake violation is reported.161 Audit reports should be widely 
distributed at various levels of management.162 
Adequate reporting mechanisms are essential for effective 
compliance.163 Many companies have chosen to implement anonymous 
reporting “hotlines.”164 SOX requires such anonymous reporting 
mechanisms.165 Hotlines should protect the confidentiality of callers, 
solicit relevant information, and receive ample advertisement.166 In 
general, compliance staff should be accessible and other reporting 
mechanisms should also be available.167 Whistleblower protection is 
                                                     
156. Killingsworth, supra note 141, at 965. 
157. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 8B2.1(b)(5)–(6). 
158. See Killingsworth, supra note 141, at 985–86. 
159. BASRI, supra note 16, at 34–35; DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 6. 
160. MILLER, supra note 18, at 214. 
161. BASRI, supra note 16, at 279. 
162. Id. at 285. 
163. See DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 5. 
164. BASRI, supra note 16, at 34–35. 
165. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,787 (April 16, 
2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 and 274 (2018)).  
166. BASRI, supra note 16, at 325. 
167. DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 5. 
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another key element of effective compliance.168 Failing to protect 
whistleblowers can lead to public scandal and SEC investigation.169 
Companies must conduct internal investigations after violations.170 
Investigators must be independent, knowledgeable and have enough 
power to collect the necessary information.171 When monitoring or 
investigation uncovers violations, companies must also adequately 
respond to misconduct by self-reporting violations, cooperating with law-
enforcement, and denouncing the behavior in question.172 Information 
learned during investigations should be used to improve compliance 
programs.173 In sum, companies must “demonstrate recognition of the 
seriousness of the company’s misconduct . . . and the implementation of 
measures to reduce the risk of repetition of such misconduct, including 
measures to identify future risks.”174 
E. Third-Party Issues 
One of the most complex and difficult compliance problems companies 
face is not the compliance of their own employees but rather the 
noncompliance of business partners. In 2016, compliance experts noted 
that, “third-party risk continues to be the most widely cited challenge to 
compliance and ethics programs.”175 
Even when companies are not directly responsible for compliance 
violations, and have outsourced their liability to subsidiaries or third 
parties, global scandals can still generate criticism.176 For example, Costco 
faced public outcry, expensive litigation, and a stock price decrease when 
information became public that it was selling farmed shrimp from a 
supplier that sourced the shrimp’s diet of cheap fish from a company that 
                                                     
168. MILLER, supra note 18, at 339–69. 
169. See, e.g., Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Admits to Signs of Worker Retaliation, CNN (Jan. 24, 2017, 4:21 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/investing/wells-fargo-retaliation-ethics-line/index.html?iid=EL 
[https://perma.cc/6WVQ-UAQ3] (discussing Wells Fargo’s failure to protect internal whistleblowers). 
170. DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 5; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 73, 
§ 8B2.1(b)(7); JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 45, § 9-28.000. 
171. See supra note 170. 
172. See SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO 
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS (2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-
44969.htm [https://perma.cc/9YCU-X2W8]; BASRI, supra note 16, at 619–24; MILLER, supra note 
18, at 224. 
173. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 61–62. 
174. PILOT PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 4. 
175. DELOITTE, supra note 26, at 5. 
176. Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747 (2014).  
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used the efforts of unpaid, forced labor.177 Risks of third-party 
noncompliance must be integrated into risk assessment.178 Companies 
should communicate compliance expectations with their partners and 
enforce penalties when they find partners in violation.179 Many companies 
have instituted supplier codes of conduct and company standards along 
with their general codes of conduct.180 For example, Clorox has a general 
“Business Partner Code of Conduct” communicating the company’s 
commitment to human rights, safe working conditions, environmental 
protection, ethical conduct, and fair business practices.181 Other 
companies have more detailed requirements for business partners.182 Due 
diligence should be built into procurement and accounts payable 
operations.183 
Several regulatory bodies have specifically addressed third-party 
issues. The SEC may have the power to force companies to monitor third-
party compliance.184 For example, the Conflict Minerals Rule in 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires companies to ensure that 
when they purchase minerals used in production, the money is not used to 
support conflict in the Congo.185 The FCPA applies when an organization 
makes a payment to a third party knowing that the third party will then 
make a forbidden payment to a foreign government official.186 A company 
may be deemed to know of a third-party’s bribe if the company “is aware 
                                                     
177. Joel Rosenblatt, Costco Defeats Lawsuit Over Shrimp Linked to Thai Slave Labor, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-25/costco-defeats-
lawsuit-over-shrimp-linked-to-thai-slave-labor (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
178. DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 7. 
179. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 60. 
180. BASRI, supra note 16, at 686. 
181. THE CLOROX CO., BUSINESS PARTNER CODE OF CONDUCT (2013), 
https://www.thecloroxcompany.com/wp-content/uploads/clorox-business-partner-code-of-conduct.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29ZF-75P8]. 
182. MICROSOFT, STANDARDS OF SUPPLIER CONDUCT AT MICROSOFT (2018), 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/procurement/supplier-conduct.aspx [https://perma.cc/TM66-2UL9]. 
183. Laura Jacobus, DOJ’s Andrew Weissmann and Hui Chen Talk Corporate Compliance in 
Exclusive Interview, ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (Feb. 2, 2016, 8:47AM), 
https://connects.ethics.org/blogs/laura-jacobus/2016/02/01/doj-interview [https://perma.cc/RW9L-
RWAL] (quoting Hui Chen, DOJ Compliance Expert). 
184. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 61. 
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2018). The Trump Administration has been hostile to such 
reporting/monitoring requirements and went so far as to use the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to 
disapprove a similar rule in Section 1504 requiring corporations to disclose payments to U.S. and 
foreign governments in developing oil, gas or mineral sites. Keys, supra note 32, at 103. Section 1502 
could not be repealed via the CRA because it went into effect in January 2013. 
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3).  
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of a high probability” that a bribe might be made.187 To avoid liability for 
third-party actions, organizations are instructed to implement compliance 
programs to prevent and detect misconduct.188 
F. The Interconnectedness of the Elements 
Companies must implement all of the elements in concert with each 
other for effective compliance. A DOJ compliance expert once described 
compliance as “similar to how an insurance company might risk-assess a 
car and driver [with] the various components of the compliance function” 
compared to “the control panel, seat-belts, and air bags” and the driver 
analogized to the “leadership and key stakeholders of the company.”189 
Every component is necessary to detect and minimize harm and 
“resources and processes must be a shared effort.”190 It is easy to see the 
interconnectedness of the elements and the problems that can arise when 
only a few of the elements are implemented; policies and procedures are 
meaningless without employees who understand, with employees who 
understand but have no way to report violations, or with employees who 
understand but in practice are incentivized toward noncompliant 
behavior.191 The careful drafting of the Guidelines indicates that “each 
element was in the standards for a reason.”192 
III. CONTINUED NONCOMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
PROBLEMS 
Despite the growing importance of compliance and the wealth of 
information available concerning what makes an effective compliance 
program, compliance programs still fail to prevent noncompliant actions. 
Although “no compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity 
by a corporation’s employees”193 evidence of continued noncompliance is 
substantial.194 Corporate crime continues.195 
                                                     
187. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(B).  
188. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 125, at 60. 
189. Jacobus, supra note 183 (quoting Hui Chen, DOJ Compliance Expert). 
190. Id. 
191. Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra note 20, at 481–84. 
192. Id. at 484. 
193. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 45, § 9-28.800(B). 
194. See Ochoa, supra note 22, at 177 n.32; Stucke, supra note 97, at 782.  
195. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLE: PROMOTING COMPLIANCE 
WITH COMPETITION LAW 2011, at 23 (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/ 
promotingcompliancewithcompetitionlaw2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7KS-LJ29]; FBI, FINANCIAL 
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Many companies have incomplete or subpar compliance programs.196 
Compliance programs are often poorly funded or understaffed.197 For 
example, in the early 2000s, Siemens’s compliance department only had 
six lawyers to monitor the behavior of 400,000 employees.198 The DOJ 
indicted a Siemens board member for involvement in bribing Argentinian 
officials to win a contract.199 A former Deputy Attorney General noted 
that “[t]here was no clear message from the top of the organization that 
corruption was unacceptable. Instead the message was keep your sales 
figures up, meet your sales goals, and do whatever you need to do, just do 
not let us know about it.”200 
Compliance officers often do not receive the support and influence they 
need to do a good job201 and “21% of companies do not have a designated 
CCO.”202 Of the companies that do have CCOs, “[n]ot quite 
half . . . (43%) reported that the CCO held a seat on the CEO’s executive 
management committee, or its equivalent, while 37% of responses said 
their CCO held no such seat . . . . [T]he CCO clearly could receive more 
top-level visibility.”203 “Many chief compliance officers and their 
departments struggle to win the battle of convincing others that 
compliance matters, which is critical for the cultural transformation to 
which any serious compliance program aspires.”204 
In some ways, compliance programs remain difficult to assess. 
“Organizations are complex and what works at one level of an 
                                                     
CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2011, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011 [https://perma.cc/79KU-JL9V].  
196. See Muel Kaptein, The Ethics of Organizations: A Longitudinal Study of the U.S. Working 
Population, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 601, 615 (2010) (finding from surveyed employees of organizations 
with over 200 employees from eleven industries that only 15.6% of their organizations adopted all 
seven of the Guidelines’ components and that 18.38% of their organizations lacked an ethics code).  
197. See PWC, GETTING AHEAD OF THE WATCHDOGS: REAL-TIME COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
2018 STATE OF COMPLIANCE 1, 5 (2018) (37% of 825 risk and compliance executives worldwide say 
that “insufficient budget to meet additional needs associated with technology is a top challenge”); 
DELOITTE supra note 26, at 6 (noting “[a] majority of responses (59%) reported having a total annual 
budget for enterprise-wide compliance functions—including people, processes, and technology—of 
less than $5 million”). 
198. McNulty, Knox & Harned, supra note 75, at 384. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. See generally Linda K. Trevio et al., Legitimating the Legitimate: A Grounded Theory Study 
of Legitimacy Work Among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 123 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 186 (2014).  
202. DELOITTE, supra note 26, at 6. 
203. Id. at 7; see also Stucke, supra note 97, at 832. 
204. DELOITTE, supra note 26, at 9. 
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organization may not work at another level of the same organization.”205 
A 2016 Deloitte study found that “[d]espite utilizing a myriad of ways to 
measure effectiveness, the majority of [corporate compliance executives] 
were either not confident (14%) or only somewhat confident (45%) that 
the metrics of their compliance program assessments gave a realistic sense 
of how well the compliance program is working. Only 32% were 
confident (27%) or very confident (5%).”206 
A. Piecemeal Enforcement and Adjudication 
Another problem with compliance is the piecemeal nature of 
compliance enforcement and adjudication coming from many different 
regulatory bodies and courts.207 The DOJ, the SEC, and many other 
agencies as well as different units within them have different compliance 
requirements which sometimes omit some of the elements of effective 
compliance as recognized in the Guidelines.208 The problem is that “there 
is not consistency between agencies in terms of the criteria they are 
applying if they are applying any criteria at all for judging an ethics and 
compliance program” also “if there is more than one agency involved, it 
is unclear the extent to which” they are applying “different standards” and 
using “different criteria.”209 Different divisions within the DOJ can 
address different types of violations (e.g., antitrust, fraud), but sometimes 
fail to address overall problems with compliance.210 
Furthermore, because enforcement personnel will recognize 
compliance efforts during prosecution decisions, settlement negotiation, 
and sentencing, corporations are incentivized to implement effective 
compliance programs.211 However, it is unclear to companies the extent 
to which ethics and compliance programs factor into enforcement 
decisions and “also the extent to which companies were actually given 
credit” for effective compliance.212 Few judges evaluate a company’s 
compliance program under the Guidelines because most enforcement 
decisions are made by the DOJ or some other enforcement agency prior 
                                                     
205. Sokol, supra note 17, at 411. 
206. DELOITTE, supra note 26, at 10.  
207. Root, supra note 59, at 1010. 
208. Id. at 1031; see also Stucke, supra note 97, at 481–84. 
209. McNulty, Knox & Harned, supra note 75, at 392; see also Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra 
note 20, at 482.  
210. Root, supra note 59, at 1032. 
211. See supra Section I.B. 
212. McNulty, Knox & Harned, supra note 75, at 392. 
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to courtroom litigation.213 The language contained in most DOJ DPAs 
(outside of the FCPA context) is sparse, and the SEC rarely publishes 
declinations or the reasons for DPAs.214 
When the latest amendments to the Guidelines were released in 2010, 
some “hoped that the government would announce a more robust 
incentive for corporate compliance programs such as blanket non-
prosecution policy or affirmative defense for companies with effective 
anti-bribery measures,” but the Guidelines did not incorporate such 
incentives.215 Notably, 84% of compliance officers said that “when there 
is information from an enforcement agency about how an ethics and 
compliance program mattered in the enforcement decision, [they] take 
that and use it with their boards and their CEOs and their C suite 
executives to help make the case for continued investment in their 
[compliance] program.”216 
Occasionally, enforcement decisions focus on specific aspects of 
compliance rather than the whole program.217 This approach pushes 
corporations to use cost analysis to determine whether to implement 
specific elements of effective compliance.218 This is unfortunate because, 
“[w]hen a company seeks to increase sales, decrease costs, or increase 
production, it would not rely on booklets, lectures, or mere slogans. So, 
too, in preventing crime and misconduct, there is no replacement for 
effective management tools.”219 Some regulatory bodies have no structure 
for assessing compliance programs,220 Prosecutors may lack the time, 
resources, or expertise to evaluate compliance reforms.221 Additionally, 
agencies only intervene when a violation has already occurred meaning 
that they may have “hindsight” bias and view the corporation’s 
compliance program more harshly.222 
                                                     
213. Id. 
214. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS 
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 23, 
33 (Dec. 18, 2009). 
215. Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 69 BUS. L. 107, 110 (2013). 
216. McNulty, Knox & Harned, supra note 75, at 392. 
217. See Plea Agreement, United States v. ABB, Inc., No. H-10-664, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 
2010); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No. 1:12-cr-00080, at *3 
(D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012). 
218. Stucke, supra note 97, at 800. 
219. Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra note 20, at 426–27.  
220. Id. at 427. 
221. Jacobus, supra note 183 (quoting Hui Chen); see also Donald C. Langevort, Cultures of 
Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 971 (2017). 
222. Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV. 773, 774–78 (2004).  
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IV. NEW APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE FOR THE SEC AND 
THE DOJ 
The SEC and the DOJ already have the framework and authority to 
promote compliance programs, and they should do so by incorporating 
the Guidelines as a baseline during regulatory action. More DPAs and 
declination letters should reference the entirety of the Guidelines rather 
than solely one or two elements, and these documents should be 
publicized with an emphasis on the positive role of effective compliance 
programs. Lastly, the agencies should consider requiring independent 
monitoring of compliance programs in agreements and penalty 
settlements with companies. 
A. Framework and Authority: The Guidelines as a Baseline in 
Criminal and Civil Actions 
The DOJ directs prosecutors to consider the “existence and 
effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program” and 
the corporation’s efforts “to implement an effective corporate compliance 
program or to improve an existing one” when “determining whether to 
bring charges and in negotiating plea or other agreements.”223 DPAs 
sometimes reference the Guidelines, but “these enforcement-related 
incentives, however, do not typically encourage corporations to engage in 
comprehensive modifications to their compliance programs; instead, the 
focus is on a particular aspect of a firm’s compliance program.”224 
The Guidelines are for criminal actions and technically do not govern 
or restrict behavior associated with civil enforcement actions.225 However, 
the over-arching purpose of the Guidelines was to lay out a framework for 
corporation-wide long-lasting effective compliance; “[p]unishment is 
thus not the ultimate purpose of the organizational guidelines . . . [r]ather 
their ultimate purpose is the promotion of good corporate citizenship.”226 
All of the elements contained in the Guidelines are necessary for an 
effective compliance program.227 
DOJ divisions and the SEC could eliminate the problems of piecemeal 
enforcement by utilizing the elements in the Guidelines, and the wealth of 
                                                     
223. DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 1. 
224. Root, supra note 59, at 1014–15; supra Part II. 
225. Root, supra note 59, at 1015. 
226. Murphy, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 97, at 706; see supra Section I.B.4. 
227. See supra Part I. 
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guidance surrounding them, in enforcement decisions.228 The Guidelines 
can provide consistency for companies seeking to understand how their 
compliance program will be evaluated. Many federal agencies have 
already incorporated at least some elements and reference the Guidelines 
in their compliance information, so the only change would be to make 
compliance guidance more complete.229 The DOJ should actively 
encourage widespread adoption of the language of the Guidelines across 
agencies. The DOJ and the SEC should refrain from “shopping the 
sentencing guidelines.”230 A corporation should have the burden to show 
that its compliance program, at minimum, incorporates the seven elements 
contained in the Guidelines along with risk assessment and cultural 
considerations. No company should receive mitigation credit without 
meeting the minimum seven elements. DPAs that require companies to 
enhance compliance should reference all elements. 
The DOJ and the SEC are in a good position to assess compliance and 
are developing their expertise and guidance in this area. They interact with 
companies from varied industries with effective compliance programs and 
companies with failed compliance programs.231 These agencies already 
receive company documentation and know a company’s history with 
compliance.232 They have the power to dialogue with companies as equals. 
The federal government has the power to trigger positive change in 
corporate compliance programs and should employ that power to make 
the Guidelines a minimum requirement.233 One day, Congress may be in 
a position to amend SOX to incorporate the Guidelines as a prophylactic 
measure companies are required to take. Until that day, the DOJ and SEC 
should intentionally widen their enforcement focus to include all 
elements. 
B. A Publicized Holistic Approach to Incorporating the Guidelines 
into DPAs 
In the last decade, “the number of []DPA provisions pertaining to 
compliance programs has been increasing consistently;” however, these 
                                                     
228. See supra Part II. 
229. DOJ EVALUATION, supra note 47, at 8. 
230. Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra note 20, at 481 (“shopping” refers to the practice of se
lecting only some guidelines to enforce while ignoring others). 
231. Root, supra note 59, at 1039 (“[T]he government is already in possession of all the data and 
resources it need to allow it to effectively assess the types of misconduct that corporations are 
resolving with governmental actors.”). 
232. Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra note 20, at 485. 
233. Id. 
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DPAs often focus on a limited selection of the elements of effective 
compliance programming.234 Even when DPAs reference compliance 
programs, it is often unclear to corporations to what extent the agency 
considered the corporation’s existing compliance program in making the 
decision whether to prosecute and unclear exactly what the agency was 
looking for when examining the compliance program.235 In order for the 
Guidelines to have the strongest impact, the DOJ and the SEC must 
provide companies with information about the use of the Guidelines, or 
other compliance requirements, in agency agreements with companies 
they investigate.236 “[F]irms will demand, and the courts and DOJ must 
supply, uniform, clear, and objective evaluative standards and a public 
accounting of how and when ethics programs are taken into account” in 
DPAs, mitigation, and settlements.237 In short agencies must “[m]ake it 
very clear, through actual cases, that government is actually [using the 
Guidelines] and will recognize good programs.” 238 
The DOJ should consider publishing more declination letters and/or 
statements of the DOJ’s reasoning behind declination or DPAs. This will 
alleviate the informational uncertainty discussed above and provide CCOs 
with the information they need to bolster executive and board support for 
their compliance programs.239 For example, the DOJ’s declination letter 
in Re: Nortek Inc. simply states that Nortek undertook steps “to enhance 
its compliance program and its internal accounting controls” but did not 
describe the steps.240 All of the declinations issued since the DOJ’s launch 
of the FCPA pilot program in 2015 contain this sparse language.241 When 
contemplating the pilot program, Assistant Attorney General Leslie 
Caldwell stated, “transparency informs companies what conduct will 
result in what penalties and what sort of credit they can receive for self-
disclosure and cooperation with an investigation.”242 The language of 
current declination letters provides little meaningful transparency about 
                                                     
234. Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013, 70 BUS. L. 61, 104–06 (2014). 
235. See supra Part III. 
236. Id.  
237. Stucke, supra note 97, at 801. 
238. Murphy, Policies in Conflict, supra note 20, at 485. 
239. See supra Part III. 
240. See Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., to Luke 
Cadigan, Esq., K&L Gates (June 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/865406/download [https://perma.cc/NT3P-CKMM] (DOJ Declination Letter to Nortek). 
241. See Declinations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/corporate-
enforcement-policy/declinations, (last visited Feb, 25, 2018). 
242. Caldwell, supra note 14. 
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what the DOJ looked at when assessing a company’s compliance program 
in practice.243 
The pilot program has led to some detailed compliance assessments in 
FCPA DPAs, like in the Telia DPA.244 In 2017, the DOJ entered into five 
FCPA DPAs with in-depth compliance instruction and published two 
FCPA declination letters, but the other seven DPAs contained little 
assessment of the company’s compliance program.245 For example, the 
Prime Partner Non-Prosecution Agreement related to tax fraud failed to 
mention compliance at all.246 The Evaluation of Corporate Compliance 
Programs, published in 2017, provides general notice as to what DOJ 
looks for in compliance programs.247 This is a good start, but companies 
must know the DOJ’s actual criteria in determining real cases. 
As “the DOJ and courts discourage firms from taking a checklist one-
size-fits-all approach to compliance, it would be counterproductive if they 
used a checklist for compliance measures to assess an ethics program’s 
effectiveness.”248 Each corporation’s program should have an 
“individualized determination.”249 To this end, the DOJ’s new compliance 
counsel should be involved in DPA negotiations, and the SEC should 
consider creating a similar role dedicated to assessing compliance.250 The 
SEC appointed the compliance counsel to “help prosecutors develop 
                                                     
243. Occasionally, DOJ personnel have later highlighted what they valued when assessing 
compliance programs. See, e.g., Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the American 
Conference Institute’s 28th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-american-conference-institute-s-28th [https://perma.cc/QF9V-
S8LK]. Breuer highlighted Morgan Stanley’s “extensive training of bank employees” as a reason why 
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appropriate benchmarks for evaluating corporate compliance and 
remediation measures and communicat[e] with stakeholders in setting 
those benchmarks.”251 Agency compliance counsel can provide 
transparency and expertise, ensuring that the agency takes a holistic 
approach to compliance. When Hui Chen was appointed as compliance 
counsel in 2015, compliance professionals followed her work and 
priorities closely.252 They prepared for “thorough” evaluation of their 
compliance programs requiring them to “prove” their compliance 
programs were working and “provide tangible ‘metrics’” about program 
improvements.253 The attention of compliance professionals can only 
improve the quality of DPAs and the quality of corporate compliance 
programs. 
A holistic approach would allow companies to avoid “command-and-
control” messaging that undermines a compliant corporate culture by 
focusing too much on monitoring, detection, and punishment.254 
Compliance programs that focus on deterrence and the threat of 
punishment encourage employees to use cost-benefit analysis to 
determine their self-interest in complying rather than reinforcing 
employee commitment to ethical values.255 A holistic approach, 
referencing all of the elements, places less emphasis on deterrence and 
punishment. “By encouraging a more comprehensive overhaul of firms’ 
compliance programs, governmental actors may prompt compliance 
gatekeepers within firms to consider questions of ethics in addition to 
questions associated with ensuring effective policing methods within the 
organization.”256 This programmatic focus on ethics, in turn, would 
refocus compliance on corporate culture, an essential element of effective 
compliance, allowing employees to develop a “source of internal guidance 
in novel situations,” making the compliance program more resilient in the 
long term.257 
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C. Independent Monitoring to Promote Effective Compliance 
Programs 
The commentary to the Guidelines currently explains that, “[t]o assess 
the efficacy of a compliance and ethics program submitted by the 
organization, the court may employ appropriate experts who shall be 
afforded access to all material possessed by the organization that is 
necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed program.”258 
Thus, some DPAs already include the appointment of an independent 
compliance monitor when a company has committed persistent 
violations.259 In 2010, about 32% of FCPA settlements included a 
compliance monitorship, but monitorship is less popular in other areas of 
DOJ and SEC enforcement.260 The DOJ and the SEC should consider 
making independent monitoring a regular component of DPAs and 
settlements with companies lacking complete and effective compliance 
programs. In the same way that the SEC requires independent financial 
auditing, agencies should require independent compliance monitoring that 
addresses effective compliance and the Guidelines holistically.261 
Monitorships are beneficial because monitors provide expertise and 
develop “recommendations that the organization should implement to 
ensure long-term legal and regulatory compliance,”262 and because 
“private firms” find the appointment of an independent monitor 
“unpalatable” and are thus motivated to “make comprehensive 
compliance reform a priority.”263 Monitorships are expensive and time-
consuming.264 However, utilizing a monitorship helps to avoid the 
problem of uninformed prosecutors or bureaucrats assessing compliance, 
and a monitor’s stamp of approval can restore public confidence in a 
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corporation’s compliance function and help the corporation to regain 
market benefits.265 
The compliance industry has grown exponentially in the last decade 
reaching a point where there are compliance professionals in every 
industry and many large well-recognized companies with expertise in 
compliance.266 Both the government and the monitored organization 
typically take an active role in the selection of the monitor, as the 
organization submits three potential candidates and the DOJ selects 
one.267 Monitors use their expertise to “engage in a sort of root-cause 
analysis,” rather than simply assessing compliance with specific 
government demands.268 “The goal of a monitorship is to ensure that the 
corporation implements an effective ethics and compliance program,”269 
and monitors are well-situated to assess the elements of an effective 
compliance program within a specific corporation. The role of the monitor 
is not to punish the company but to work alongside the company.270 For 
example, Miron’s NPA required the construction company to retain a 
monitor to develop long-term compliance recommendations concerning 
its billing, financial reporting, and Corporate Responsibility Program.271 
Some authors have expressed concern that monitors fail to take “deep 
dives into the corporation’s culture.”272 This concern would be alleviated 
by ensuring that monitors are experts in regards to the requirements of the 
Guidelines, the need for a compliant corporate culture, and the industry 
concerned. For example, the Miron monitor had forty-one years of public 
accounting experience serving the construction industry but little 
experience with the Guidelines and compliance programming.273 The 
ABA recently adopted the Monitor Standards, in an attempt to push the 
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DOJ to standardize its selection and use of monitors.274 Guidelines 
expertise should be part of this process. In general, monitorships must be 
crafted “for the case at hand” and monitors must be independent parties 
who conduct their own initial assessment of a company’s compliance 
program.275 Corporations have the same need for transparency and 
consistency when it comes to monitorships.276 The DOJ should publish 
the details of the monitor selection process, monitor work plans and 
ultimately some facts about monitor assessment of compliance 
programs.277 Additionally, agencies and the DOJ might consider creating 
a system for preserving the institutional compliance knowledge of 
monitors for use during future monitorships.278 
Agencies should utilize monitorships more often and the role of the 
monitor should be defined to ensure that the monitor considers the 
Guidelines and all the elements of effective compliance. DPAs and 
settlements that require monitorships should incorporate language 
referencing the Guidelines and monitor assessments should contemplate 
all elements of effective compliance. 
CONCLUSION 
The corporate and regulatory demand for effective corporate 
compliance has only grown in the last several years.279 This demand led 
to the creation of the seven elements of an “Effective Compliance and 
Ethics Program.”280 These elements have sparked additional dialogue 
about how to make compliance programs effective.281 However, 
companies still sometimes fail to create effective compliance programs.282 
The SEC and the DOJ can do more to encourage those companies with 
effective compliance programs and push for better programs at companies 
with compliance failures. In order to encourage effective corporate 
compliance, the DOJ and the SEC should use the Guidelines as a baseline 
and should publicly reference all of the elements delineated in the 
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Guidelines in DPAs and declination letters.283 Additionally, the agencies 
should look toward monitorships for an added layer of compliance 
expertise and assurance in situations where corporations have failed to 
develop effective compliance programs.284 
 
                                                     
283. See supra Part IV. 
284. See supra Part IV. 
